Education

2000 Kobe University, Ph.D. (Economics)

1997 Kobe University, M.A. (Economics)

1995 Kobe University, B.A. (Management)

Academic Position

2016 Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University, Professor

2004 Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University, Associate Professor

2001 Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University, Assistant Professor

2000 Research Institute of Economics and Business, Kobe University, Assistant Researcher

Visiting

2016/02 - 2016/08 Visiting faculty: Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, U.S.

2011/04 - 2011/06 Visiting scholar: Department of Economics, ColumbiaUniversity, U.S.

2004/08 - 2005/08 Visiting scholar: Department of Economics, Columbia University, U.S.

2004/01 - 2004/08 Visiting scholar: Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, U.S.

Research Field

Game Theory, Contract Theory, Organizational Economics, Coordination Problem

Current Ressearch

• “Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring,” (joint with Tadashi Sekiguchi)

• “Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player,” (joint with Hitoshi Sadakane)

Papers

• “Finitely Repeated Games with Monitoring Options,” (with Tadashi Sekiguchi), Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 148, Issue 5, pp. 1929–1952, 2013. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.011

• “The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs,” (with Eiichi Miyagawa and Tadashi Sekiguchi) , Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 139, pp.192-221, 2008. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.04.001

• “Repeated Games with Observation Costs,” (with Eiichi Miyagawa and Tadashi Sekiguchi), mimeo. [01/27/2003]

• “Principal-Multiagent Relationships with Costly Monitoring,” Discussion Paper No.2002.26, Kobe University, 2002.

• “Coalition-Proof Sharing Rule in Partnerships,” mimeo. 2001.

• “A Study on Social Cost of Meetings,” Kokumin-Keizai Zasshi, vol. 217, no. 4, pp. 61-77, 2018. (in Japanese)

• “An Analysis on Information Acquisition and Transmission,” (coauthored with Hitoshi Sadakane) Kokumin Keizai-zasshi, vol. 213, No. 4, 43-59, 2014. (in Japanese)

• “Game Theoretic Analysis on an Influence of Stealth Marketing on Reputation,” (coauthored with Yoshifumi Hino) Kokumin Keizai-zasshi, vol. 209, No. 3, 73-87, 2014. (in Japanese)

• “On Nontrivial Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games,” Kokumin Keizai-zasshi, vol. 205, No. 4, 39-53, 2012. (in Japanese)

• “A Study on Monitoring Structure in Organizations,” Kokumin Keizai-zasshi, vol. 201, No. 5, 79-95, 2010. (in Japanese)

• “Contract Structure of Tax Payment by Self-Assessment,” Sangyo Keiri, (coauthored with Kazumi Suzuki) vol. 66, No. 2, 109-116, 2006. (in Japanese)

• “An Analysis on Effeciency under Hidden Action and Information,” Kokumin Keizai-zasshi, vol. 190, No. 5, 27-39, 2004. (in Japanese)

• “Reputation Effect in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Costly Monitoring: A Random Matching Model,” Kokumin Keizai-zasshi, vol. 188, No. 3, 97-108, 2003. (in Japanese)

Books

• Organizational Economics. Yuhikaku, 2019. (coauthored with Hideshi Itoh and Hajime Kobayashi). (in Japanese) ISBN:978-4-641-16550-2